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financial system
By Bryan J. Noeth and Rajdeep Sengupta T
he term “shadow banking” has been 
attributed to 2007 remarks by econo-
mist and money manager Paul McCulley 
to describe a large segment of financial 
intermediation that is routed outside the bal-
ance sheets of regulated commercial banks 
and other depository institutions.  Shadow 
banks are defined as financial intermediaries 
that conduct functions of banking “without 
access to central bank liquidity or public sec- 
tor credit guarantees.” 
1  As shown in Figure 1, 
the size of the shadow banking sector was 
close to $20 trillion at its peak and shrank 
to about $15 trillion last year, making it at 
least as big as, if not bigger than, the tradi-
tional banking system.
2  Given its size and 
role in the financial crisis, it would be useful 
to understand the mechanics of shadow 
banking.  To do so, some basics of traditional 
banking need to be understood first.
Simply put, banks are intermediaries that 
obtain funds from lenders in the form of 
deposits and provide funds to borrowers in 
the form of loans.
3  The principal function 
of a bank is that of maturity transforma-
tion—coming from the fact that lenders 
prefer deposits to be of a shorter maturity 
than borrowers, who typically require loans 
for longer periods.  It is important to point 
out that, because of sudden liquidity needs of 
individual agents or businesses, this function 
cannot be performed by individual agents or 
businesses alone—therein lies the rationale 
for a bank.  Banks are able to achieve this 
transformation by exploiting the fact that 
only a small fraction of depositors have 
liquidity needs at a given time.  Therefore, the 
bank can store a small fraction of its deposits 
in the form of liquid assets (readily convert-
ible to cash) and lend out the rest in the form 
of term (illiquid) loans.  This function is 
also known as qualitative asset transforma-
tion because, by changing the maturity of its 
assets, the bank also changes their liquidity.
4
However, by performing this function, 
a bank is essentially rendered fragile.  The 
fragility comes from the fact that even a 
healthy bank can be the victim of a bank 
run.  If all depositors demand their deposits 
back, the bank would have to liquidate all 
its assets (even those that are not liquid) to 
fulfill depositors’ demands.  Since almost 
no bank can liquidate all its assets within a 
short period without suffering a loss in value, 
a problem of illiquidity can essentially turn 
into a problem of insolvency and the collapse 
of the bank.  Accordingly, depositors are 
acting rationally when they withdraw their 
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deposits even at the smallest hint of bad 
news.
5  More often than not, such bank runs 
are hardly limited to just one bank, precipi-
tating what is called a banking panic.
Given their inherent fragility, banks typi-
cally require credit enhancements in the 
form of insurance of deposits or emergency 
access to funds from the central bank.
6  In 
most countries, public funds are the source 
of such provisions of emergency funding.  
Indeed, the financial history of the United 
States is replete with stories about bank runs 
and bank failures prior to 1934.  In that year, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. was 
created, ending runs on commercial banks 
in the U.S.
However, the end of bank runs does not 
imply the end of bank failures.  Indeed, 
the inclusion of such credit-enhancement 
measures, especially those funded by third 
parties, creates a significant moral hazard for 
banks.
7  Banks investing in risky loans ben-
efit from higher returns on the slim chance 
of success, whereas the taxpayer is left to bail 
out depositors in the likely event that the 
banks fail.
8  Regulations seeking to prevent 
such moral hazard require banks to hold 
significantly higher capital for increased 
riskiness of loans (assets) on their balance 
sheet—known as a risk-weighted capital 
adequacy requirement.  Banks view rais-
ing such capital as costly and often engage 
in practices that would help prevent them 
from having to do so.
9  One such practice is 
the creation of off-balance-sheet entities to 
host some of the banks’ assets and, thereby, 
reduce their regulatory capital require-
ments.  This practice is often viewed as one 
of the major reasons behind the creation and 
growth of shadow banking.
Broadly speaking, credit intermediation 
through the shadow banking system is much 
like that through a traditional bank—it ful-
fills the principal function of qualitative  
asset transformation.  However, unlike tradi-
tional banking, which involves a simple pro-
cess of deposit-taking and originating loans 
that are held to maturity, shadow banking 
employs a much more complicated process 
to achieve maturity transformation.  At the 
deposit end of the shadow banking system 
are wholesale investors (providers of funds) 
using the repo market and money market 
intermediaries such as money market mutual 
funds (MMMFs) to provide short-term 
loans that are essentially withdrawable 
on demand.  At the loan origination end 
are finance companies and even tradi-
tional banks that engage in the activity of 
originating loans, much like the traditional 
banking system. 
The shadow banking system intermedi-
ates between the ultimate consumer of funds 
(borrower) and the wholesale investor of 
funds, whose liquidity needs may preclude 
long-term investments.  Shadow banking 
comprises a chain of intermediaries that are 
engaged in the transfer of funds channeled 
upstream in exchange for securities and loan 
documents that are moving downstream.  
Therefore, what was once accomplished 
under a single roof in the traditional bank-
ing system is now done over a sequence of 
steps in the shadow banking system, each 
performed by specialized entities that are 
not vertically integrated. 
The Deposit End  
of the Shadow Banking System
Most advanced economies have solved 
the problem of bank runs by the creation of 
deposit insurance.  In 1980, deposit insur-
ance in the U.S. was capped at $100,000; 
after the crisis, this limit was raised to 
$250,000.  This meant that the demand for 
safe, short-term investments from large, 
cash-rich financial and nonfinancial com-
panies remained unfulfilled.  The shadow 
banking system fulfilled this demand in two 
ways—both of which made extensive use of 
widely available financial securities.
The first of these arrangements uses repo, 

















Shadow Bank vs. Traditional Bank Liabilities
Figure 1
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or repurchase, transactions, whereby firms 
with surplus cash buy securities for cash only 
and then resell them back after a short term.  
Effectively, this repo transaction is a short-
term cash loan to the seller of the security, 
with the security acting as collateral on the 
loan.  Repo transactions can be open-ended 
and rolled over on a daily basis, making them 
analogous to deposits at a traditional bank 
that are withdrawable on demand.  However, 
unlike demand deposits, which derive their 
safety from deposit insurance, repo transac-
tions derive their safety from the underlying 
security that is the collateral on the loan.  In 
the event of default on the loan, the lender 
retains the right to sell the security in the 
open market and collect the proceeds. 
To enhance the safety of the transactions, 
repos are overcollateralized—that is, the 
loan amount is typically less than the face 
value of the securities used as collateral.  In 
this manner, overcollateralization imposes 
a “haircut” on the repo, a haircut that var-
ies with the credit risk on the security put 
up for collateral.  Naturally, haircuts on 
repo transactions using Treasury securities 
are lower than haircuts using comparable 
private-label securities. 
The second alternative for cash-rich 
investors is to purchase shares in money 
market mutual funds.  In MMMFs, inves-
tors pool funds to invest in high-quality 
short-term securities of the government and 
corporations.  Notably, investments (shares) 
in MMMFs are withdrawable on demand.   
The safety of investments in MMMFs comes 
from the fact that the securities they invest 
in are regulated to be of high quality and 
short maturity, such as Treasury bills and 
highest-grade commercial paper.  While 
Treasury bills are regarded as securities with 
no credit risk, commercial paper is backed 
by assets that possess some credit risk.  To 
alleviate concerns for investors, Rule 2a-7 of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s  
Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts 
the quality, maturity and diversity of invest-
ments by MMMFs. 
Cash-rich investors looking for safe invest-
ments that are withdrawable on demand 
can either purchase shares in MMMFs that 
are redeemable on demand or can purchase 
securities under a repo agreement, whereby 
the seller promises to purchase the securi-
ties back at a later date.  The two avenues are 
somewhat different.  Investments in MMMFs 
are in the form of a continuing contract with 
variable returns.  On the other hand, a repo 
transaction is a one-time contract with fixed 
returns. 
The Loan Origination End  
of the Shadow Banking System
This section refers to the processes by 
which the securities used in the deposit end 
of the system are created, either to be used as 
collateral in a repo transaction or as invest-
ments for MMMFs.  The processes described 
below are a simple prototype of numerous 
schematics involved in the creation of such 
securities.  In practice, the chains used in 
warehousing, securitization and servicing 
can be significantly more complicated than 
the illustrations given below.
Financial intermediation has moved from 
an originate-to-hold model of traditional 
banking to an originate-to-distribute model 
of modern securitized banking.  Economist 
Gary Gorton argued in a book last year that 
deregulation and increased competition in 
banking rendered the traditional model of 
banking unprofitable.  In modern banking, 
origination of loans is done mostly with a 
view to convert the loan into securities—a 
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The diagram shows a simplified, 
five-step process for converting loan 
originations into final securities.  First, 
auto loans, student loans, mortgages 
and other loans are originated by regu-
lated commercial banks and unregulated 
financial firms.  Second, a warehouse 
bank (aggregator) buys loans from one 
or more originators and pools the loans.  
Third, the pooled loans are sold to an 
administrator, usually a subsidiary of a 
large commercial or investment bank; 
the administrator creates a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) to hold the loans; 
the SPV issues securities against 
loans held in its portfolio.  Fourth, the 
securities created by the SPV are sold by 
an underwriter, typically an investment 
bank.  Finally, the securities are bought 
by investors.practice called securitization, whereby the 
transaction, processing and servicing fees 
are the intermediaries’ principal source  
of revenue.
Figure 2 illustrates the process of convert-
ing loan originations into final securities.  
The starting point in this process is the origi-
nation of loans such as auto loans, mortgages 
and student loans by regulated commercial 
banks and unregulated finance companies.  
Under the traditional model of banking, this 
loan would reside on a bank’s balance sheet, 
with the bank holding capital against the 
loan.  Under the securitized model of bank-
ing, the bank arranges to sell the loan. 
The second step of the process involves 
warehousing the loan.  This includes a ware-
house bank that purchases loans from one or 
more originators to form a pool of such loans.   
The warehouse bank is also known as the 
aggregator, seller or sponsor.  In some cases, 
this entity can be the same as the origina-
tor.  Typically, this financing occurs in the 
form of an extension of a line of credit from 
the warehouse bank to the originator of the 
loan (a finance company or a small commu-
nity bank) that closes on the loan with such 
funds.  The loan documents are then sent 
downstream to the warehouse bank to serve 
as collateral for the line of credit.
The third step in the process involves a sale 
of the pooled loans to an administrator, typi-
cally a subsidiary of a large commercial or 
investment bank.  The role of the administra-
tor is to purchase the loans from the aggre-
gator and create the special purpose vehicle 
(SPV), which would finally hold the loans.  
Often, the administrator of the SPV receives 
a fee for services rendered.  The SPV issues 
securities against loans held on its portfolio.  
(See sidebar on Page 12.)
The fourth step involves the sale of the 
securities created by the SPV.  Almost 
always, the securities are not sold directly by 
the administrator—the creator of the trust.  
Typically, the administrator sells the cer-
tificates of the trust to the underwriter.  The 
underwriter, which is generally an invest-
ment bank, purchases all such securities 
from the administrator with the respon-
sibility of offering them up for sale to the 
ultimate investors.  Notably, the underwriter 
can even retain some of these securities in 
its own portfolio.  Retaining the riskiest 
securities is often viewed as a mechanism to 
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The process transforms longer-term loans with significant 
credit risk into instruments of shorter maturity and of 
considerably lower risk that are redeemable on demand.
signal the quality of those on sale.
The fifth and final step of the process 
involves the purchase of securities by the 
investor.  The investor is then entitled to 
receive monthly payments of principal and 
interest on the securities from the SPV in 
their order of priority.  The order of priority 
on the payment of principal and interest is 
determined by payment rights accorded to 
investors, depending on the class or tranche 
of security certificates purchased.  The order 
of payment is determined in advance and 
stated on the indenture (legal document) that 
circumscribes the deal of securities generated 
in the process.  At this stage, the ultimate 
investors of such securities can hold them 
on their balance sheet, sell them or even use 
them as collateral in a repo arrangement.
Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?
The five steps above describe the simplest 
process of securitization by which securities 
are created from originated loans.  In some 
cases, segments of the process are repeated 
to create more securities.  Typically, the 
class of securities issued depends on the 
maturity and type of underlying collateral 
(loans originated upstream).  For example, 
mortgage-backed securities that are backed 
by residential or commercial mortgages typi-
cally have longer maturities than does asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) that is 
typically backed by loan receivables or credit 
card receivables.
10 
MMMFs are among the principal investors 
in short-term ABCP.  As mentioned above, 
MMMFs finance such investments with 
shares that can be redeemed on demand.  On 
the other hand, repo transactions employ 
securities of longer maturity as collateral 
for short-term borrowings of cash.  In both 
cases, the liability formed is theoretically 
withdrawable on demand and of shorter 
maturity than the assets financed.  In this 
way, the mechanics of the shadow banking 
system typically resemble the functions of a 
commercial bank.
In the creation of securities, the cash 
proceeds from the sale of securities are 
passed upstream to all participating enti-
ties—administrator, aggregator and finally 
to the originator of the loans.  At each stage, 
therefore, each participating entity relies on 
the sale of the securities and loan docu-
ments for revenue.  In addition, almost all 
of the participating entities require sources 
of short-term funding.  This can arise for 
two reasons.  First, as described earlier, the 
maturity on the securities can be of a shorter 
length than the maturity of the loans, requir-
ing the entity to roll over the securities or use 
short-term funds to pay investors.  Second, 
at each stage in the process of securitization, 
the need for short-term funding arises in the 
interval between the purchase of loans and 
their subsequent sale downstream. 
It has also been observed that all of the 
entities typically use a whole host of short-
term instruments, like financial commercial 
paper, ABCP and repo transactions, to fulfill 
their short-term funding requirements.
11  To 
the extent that each entity uses short-term 
funding in the creation of assets (loans and 
securities) of longer maturity, these enti-
ties perform the functions of a bank.  In 
this sense, individual entities of the credit 
intermediation process fulfill the functions 
of banking.   
Moreover, the process as a whole trans-
forms longer-term loans with significant 
credit risk (such as the origination of 
mortgages upstream) into instruments of 
shorter maturity and of considerably lower 
risk that are redeemable on demand (such as 
investment shares in MMMFs).  In so doing, 
the credit intermediation process as a whole 
mimics the function of a bank. 
Shadow Banking and the  
Financial Crisis of 2007-2008
Given the discussion at the beginning 
of this essay, an obvious corollary that fol-
lows is the fragility of the shadow banking 
system.  In traditional banking, the fragility 
originates in a run by the bank’s depositors.  
In securitized banking, the run comes from 
 
continued on Page 13the special Purpose Vehicle Plays a Key Role in shadow Banking
T
he Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) are 
typically organized as trusts to which the 
seller/sponsor transfers the loan documents 
(receivables)—sometimes on a rolling basis.  
The trust issues securities or trust certificates, 
which are then sold to investors. 
Notably, SPVs are legal entities with no 
employees and no locations, merely created 
by the administrator to hold the pool of loans 
and generate the securities.  Technically, an 
SPV is bankruptcy-remote; this implies that if 
the administrator (creator of the SPV) were to 
enter a bankruptcy procedure, the administra-
tor’s creditors cannot seize the assets of the 
SPV.  On the other hand, administrators will 
often provide an implicit guarantee beyond 
their contractual obligations to provide sup-
port to the SPV in the event of deterioration in 
asset performance.
13
The conduit for securitization is formed by 
the SPV and various third parties that provide 
liquidity and credit enhancements to increase 
the marketability of the security certificates 
sold to investors (Figure 3).  In some cases, the 
maturity of the certificates issued is shorter 
than the maturity on the originated loans, 
requiring the conduit to roll over maturing 
securities to pay off investors.  Consequently, 
investors are exposed to roll-over risk and 



























































as insurance against such risk.  In addition, 
investors can require credit enhancement 
(against credit risk on loans that may default) 
in the form of a letter of credit from a bank 
or insurance company.  The entities providing 
the liquidity and credit enhancements, as well 
as administrative services, are external to the 
SPV.  It is possible that the administrator of the 
SPV is the same entity providing the liquidity 
and credit enhancements.  
Interestingly, the credit enhancements on 
the securities can also be internally generated.   
Two popular ways in which credit enhance-
ment is achieved are overcollateralization 
and loan subordination (tranching).  Overcol-
lateralization is achieved when either the 
SPV purchases loans at less than face value 
or issues certificates whose total program 
size is less than that of the value of the loans 
purchased or both. 
Tranching is the process by which payouts 
on the obligations are sliced, or tranched, into 
classes, whereby the highest (senior-most) 
class of securities has seniority of claim over 
subordinated securities.  Accordingly, the more 
senior-rated tranches are less risky and gener-
ally have lower yields and higher bond credit 
ratings than the lower-rated tranches.  An SPV 
may sell tranches of various classes linked 
by a waterfall structure—a term referring to 
loans that are paid sequentially from the most 
senior-rated tranches to most-subordinate 
tranches (Figure 4).  It is important to note that 
the liquidity and credit enhancements on the 
securities can be provided by one or all of the 
methods stated above.
The sequence of payouts from the repay-
ment on loans determines the rating and 
liquidity of each class of securities.  The lowest 
tranche is known as the equity tranche— 
because it refers to the practice whereby 
the administrator or underwriter retains this 
tranche to mitigate problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  However, this norm 
has often been violated in practice.
14  At the 
peak of the recent financial boom in the U.S.,  
underwriters were able to sell equity tranches 
to investors with appetites for high risk.
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LIqUIDIty
SUPPORt
FEESthe deposit end—the providers of whole-
sale funding to the shadow banks.  The two 
markets in which such runs are most likely 
are the repo market and the commercial 
paper market. 
The evidence on runs in the markets for 
wholesale funding demonstrated the parallel 
between traditional bank runs by depositors 
in the banking panics prior to 1934 and the 
recent panic in credit markets that relied on 
wholesale funding.  As wholesale funding 
dried up for troubled shadow banks, they 
were forced to sell off assets in order to meet 
liquidity demands of investors.  Such a fire 
sale of assets lowered the prices of assets 
on similar collateral throughout the mar-
ket, raising the cost of funding for healthy 
shadow banks precipitously.
This trend was first pointed out for the 
repo market in a series of papers that are 
summarized in work by Gorton.  In the 
interdealer repo market, a run occurred 
primarily through increased haircuts on the 
securities posted as collateral.
12  In the case 
of some securities, especially those backed 
by troubled mortgage loans, the haircuts 
were close to 100 percent—implying that 
these assets were no longer eligible for repo 
transactions.  An increase in the haircuts on 
the repo implies an increased demand for 
collateral on the same loan or, conversely, a 
reduction in the supply of funds for a given 
amount of collateral.  Since the supply of 
collateral in the entire shadow banking sys-
tem is fixed over the short run, this meant 
that there was a significant liquidity crunch 
(shortfall in the supply of funds) and a steep 
rise in the cost of funding through repo 
transactions.
In the case of funding through MMMFs, 
the panic was witnessed in two major 
shocks to the commercial paper market in 
2007-2008.  The first shock came around 
July-August 2007 with the collapse of certain 
financial entities that had invested heavily 
in subprime mortgages.  This led investors 
to question the quality of even highly rated 
ABCP.  As a result, the spread of ABCP over 
the federal funds rate increased from 10 basis 
points before the shock to 150 basis points in 
the days after the shock. 
The second and more severe shock 
occurred with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008.  This led to a 
direct default on commercial paper issued 
by Lehman Brothers, $785 million of which 
was held by the Reserve Primary Fund—one 
of the largest MMMFs, with more than $65 
billion in assets.  Needless to say, the news 
of exposure triggered a run on this fund 
and quickly spread to other MMMFs.  To 
stem the run on MMMFs, the U.S. Treasury 
announced a temporary deposit insurance 
covering all money market instruments only 
three days after the collapse of Lehman.
Conclusion
The reader may question the rationale 
behind the development of the shadow bank-
ing system and all its components.  While 
some analysts have asserted that the shadow 
banking system is redundant and ineffi-
cient, it is not difficult to see the benefits of 
securitized banking.  Securitization allows 
for risk diversification across borrowers, 
products and geographic location.  In addi-
tion, it exploits benefits of both scale and 
scope in segmenting the different activities 
of credit intermediation, thereby reducing 
costs.  Moreover, by providing a variety of 
securities with varying risk and maturity, it 
provides financial institutions opportuni-
ties to better manage their portfolios than 
would be possible under traditional banking.  
Finally, and contrary to popular belief, this 
form of banking increases transparency and 
disclosure because banks now sell assets that 
would otherwise be hosted on their opaque 
balance sheets.
In summary, the shadow banking system 
can be viewed as a parallel system—one that 
is a complement to and not a substitute for 
traditional banking.  The challenge going for-
ward is to harness the benefits and mitigate 
the risks and redundancies of such a parallel 
banking system. 
Rajdeep Sengupta is an economist and Bryan 
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ENDNOTES
1, 2, 11, 14 See Adrian, Ashcraft, Boesky and Pozsar.
 3 Strictly speaking, this description fits commercial 
banks, which along with thrift institutions  
(savings and loans and credit unions) make up  
the set of depository institutions in the U.S.
 4 In addition, credit intermediation involves 
“brokerage,” whereby the bank also reduces pre- 
and post-contractual informational asymmetries 
between the borrower and the lender.  Note 
that this brokerage function is not necessarily 
exclusive to credit intermediation because many 
other intermediaries, such as used-car dealers, 
perform a similar function.  For more, see work 
by Greenbaum and Thakor.
 5 This key insight developed by Bryant and formal-
ized in Diamond and Dybvig is arguably the most 
celebrated work in banking theory.
 6 See Diamond and Dybvig.
 7 See Wheelock and Wilson.
 8 See Morrison and White.
 9 See Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer.
 10  See Anderson and Gascon for details on MMMFs 
and ABCPs.
 12  The evidence is somewhat different for the tri-
party repo market.  See Copeland, Martin and 
Walker for details.
 13  See Gorton and Souleles.
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